Facultade de Fisioterapia

Placing joint orders when holding costs are negligible and shortages are not allowed

Saavedra Nieves, Alejandro; Ignacio, García Jurado; Fiestras Janeiro, María Gloria
Abstract:
In this paper we analyse multi-agent inventory systems where each agent has a deterministic demand and a capacitated warehouse with constant holding costs. Additionally, shortages are not allowed, the leadtime is constant and the cost of placing an order has two components: a fixed cost and a variable cost. We consider that agents cooperate by placing joint orders and that the variable cost is not necessarily additive. For this model we obtain the optimal policy and propose an allocation rule for the joint ordering costs
Year:
2018
Type of Publication:
Book Chapter
Keywords:
Airport game Core allocation Cost game Inventory problem Order coalition
Editor:
Mueller, D.; Trost, R. (Eds.)
Pages:
349-360
Book:
Game Theory in Management Accounting: Implementing Incentives and Fairness. Springer, Cham
ISBN:
978-3-319-61602-5
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-61603-2_16
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