Nontransferable utility bankruptcy games

Estévez-Fernández, Arantza; Borm, Peter; Fiestras Janeiro, María Gloria

Abstract:

In this paper, we analyze bankruptcy problems with nontransferable utility (NTU) from a game theoretical perspective by redefining corresponding NTU-bankruptcy games in a tailor-made way. It is shown that NTU-bankruptcy games are both coalition-merge convex and ordinally convex. Generalizing the notions of core cover and compromise stability for transferable utility (TU) games to NTU-games, we also show that each NTU-bankruptcy game is compromise stable. Thus, NTU-bankruptcy games are shown to retain the two characterizing properties of TU-bankruptcy games: convexity and compromise stability. As a first example of a game theoretical NTU-bankruptcy rule, we analyze the adjusted proportional rule and show that this rule corresponds to the compromise value of NTU-bankruptcy games. © 2019, The Author(s).

Year:

2019

Type of Publication:

Article

Keywords:

Adjusted proportional rule; Coalition merge convexity; Compromise stability; NTU bankruptcy game; NTU bankruptcy problem; Ordinal convexity

Journal:

Top

Volume:

In press

Note:

Q4 70/84 h-index 0.982 (JCR2018)

DOI:

10.1007/s11750-019-00527-z