... Shapley value, that coincides with the expected marginal contribution assuming equiprobability. This assumption is not plausible when externalities are present in an expert system. Generalizing the concept ...
In this paper we introduce a procedure based on sampling to estimate the Owen value of a cooperative game. It is an adaptation of an analogous procedure for the estimation of the Shapley value, and it ...
We address the problem of extending the Shapley–Shubik index to the class of simple games with externalities introduced in Alonso-Meijide et al. (2017). On the one hand, we provide bounds for any efficient, ...
... expects an airport rule to satisfy. We examine some differences between the core-center and, arguably, the two more popular game theoretic solutions for airport problems: the Shapley value and the nuc ...
... and Sánchez-Rodríguez in Games Econ Behav 62:100–105, 2008) play a central role in the definition of the proposed hierarchical game. It turns out that the Shapley value of the hierarchical game coincides ...
In this paper, we present methods to compute Banzhaf-Coleman and Shapley-Shubik power indices for weighted majority games when some players are incompatible. We use the so-called generating functions as ...
A centralized inventory problem is a situation in which several agents face individual
inventory problems and make an agreement to coordinate their orders with the objective of reducing costs. In this ...
... rule, the so-called AMEF value, which is inspired by the Shapley value. We prove that, under suitable conditions, the AMEF value provides core allocations. Besides, we provide a characterization of the ...
... sections, where each section has an associated fixed cost and each agent requires some consecutive sections. We present an easy formula to calculate the Shapley value, and we present an efficient procedure ...