Facultade de Fisioterapia

A note on coalitional manipulation and centralized inventory management

Mosquera Rodríguez, Manuel Alfredo; García-Jurado, Ignacio; Fiestras Janeiro, María Gloria
Abstract:
In this note we deal with inventory games as defined in Meca et al. (Math. Methods Oper. Res. 57:483–491, 2003). In that context we introduce the property of immunity to coalitional manipulation, and demonstrate that the SOC-rule (Share the Ordering Cost) is the unique allocation rule for inventory games which satisfies this property.
Year:
2008
Type of Publication:
Article
Keywords:
Centralized multi-agent inventory cost situations; Inventory games; Coalitional manipulation; SOC-rule
Journal:
Annals of Operations Research
Volume:
158
Number:
1
Pages:
183–188
Month:
February
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-007-0240-y
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