A note on coalitional manipulation and centralized inventory management

Mosquera Rodríguez, Manuel Alfredo; García-Jurado, Ignacio; Fiestras Janeiro, María Gloria

Abstract:

In this note we deal with inventory games as defined in Meca et al. (Math. Methods Oper. Res. 57:483–491, 2003). In that context we introduce the property of immunity to coalitional manipulation, and demonstrate that the SOC-rule (Share the Ordering Cost) is the unique allocation rule for inventory games which satisfies this property.

Year:

2008

Type of Publication:

Article

Keywords:

Centralized multi-agent inventory cost situations; Inventory games; Coalitional manipulation; SOC-rule

Journal:

Annals of Operations Research

Volume:

158

Number:

1

Pages:

183–188

Month:

February

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-007-0240-y