Nontransferable utility bankruptcy games
Estévez-Fernández, Arantza; Borm, Peter; Fiestras Janeiro, María Gloria
- In this paper, we analyze bankruptcy problems with nontransferable utility (NTU) from a game theoretical perspective by redefining corresponding NTU-bankruptcy games in a tailor-made way. It is shown that NTU-bankruptcy games are both coalition-merge convex and ordinally convex. Generalizing the notions of core cover and compromise stability for transferable utility (TU) games to NTU-games, we also show that each NTU-bankruptcy game is compromise stable. Thus, NTU-bankruptcy games are shown to retain the two characterizing properties of TU-bankruptcy games: convexity and compromise stability. As a first example of a game theoretical NTU-bankruptcy rule, we analyze the adjusted proportional rule and show that this rule corresponds to the compromise value of NTU-bankruptcy games. © 2019, The Author(s).
- Type of Publication:
- Adjusted proportional rule; Coalition merge convexity; Compromise stability; NTU bankruptcy game; NTU bankruptcy problem; Ordinal convexity
- In press
- Q4 70/84 h-index 0.982 (JCR2018)